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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARK ERICKSON, 
' in in ill' f 1 1 ippellee, 
RONALD K. PLATTS, d/b/a 
E-Z STREET AUTO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case Ho. 930252-CA 
Priority No. 106' 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The defendant appeals from a final Judgment and Order entered 
on April 
3(a), U.R.A.P. The plaintiff alleged fraud in connection with the 
mileage disclosure on a used car transaction. The defendant 
counterclaimed for the unpaid balance due uiidei Uie \ i"il i ,h'l. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court correctly construe the provisions of 15 
U.S.C. 1988 (federal odometer statute) rindxn
 5 
dealer disclosure form provided notice to buyer that the actual 
m i I vi.Jift,11 i i" I!!1, unknown rather than disclosing odometer reading in 
excess of mechanical limits? 
The Trial Court's interpretation of the statute poses a 
quests correctness State v. Warner, 788 P. 
2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Did the Lower Court erroneously fail to require proof of 
fraud and misrepresei vi ncing evidence? 
The essential elements of Fraudulent Misrepresentation must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. Shuhman v. Green 
River Motel, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 P 2d (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 247 P 2d 273 (1952). 
The Trial Court erroneously awarded rescission where the 
plaintiff had failed to make an election to rescind or sue for 
damages. See Election: Rescission or Damages, 40 A.L.R. 4th, 627. 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES. PROVISIONS, AND RULES 
Any relevant text or Constitutional, Statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff filed this action January 10, 1990, alleging 
fraud in connection with the purchase of a 1980 Volkswagen Camper 
Van from defendant, a licensed used car dealer (R.l-7). On January 
18, 1990, defendant filed a Verified Answer denying the allegation 
of fraud, and seeking damages for breach of the contract of sale 
and for the balance due the defendant because the plaintiff had 
stopped payment on the credit cards he used to purchase the 
vehicle. (R. 8-18). 
The case was tried to the Court commencing September 29, 
1992. Judge Griffiths rendered a Memorandum Decision November 24, 
1992 (R. 85-88). Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and an 
Order were signed on February 1, 1993 (R.92-98) (R. 99-100). 
Plaintiff was awarded a judgment for $1,212.80 plus interest, Court 
costs of $104.00 and attorney fees of $1500.00. 
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Defendant filed a Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment, or 
for a New Trial. The Motion was argued to the Court, and denied in 
and Order dated April 1, 1993. It is from the adverse Judgment and 
Order that the defendant filed this appeal on April 16, 1993. 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the Order of the lower Court, or, in 
the alternative, for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this action, the Court was called upon to construe the 
mileage disclosure requirements as the apply to an odometer which 
has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles. The testimony 
presented at the trial was convoluted and each party challenged the 
other's accuracy as to what occurred. Upon consideration of all 
the evidence, the Court found for the plaintiff. A copy of the 
Court's Memorandum Decision is included in the addendum. 
In September, 1989, E-Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980 
Volkswagen Camper Van for sale. The record is not clear when 
defendant acquired this vehicle for sale, but the facts establish 
that defendant had it inspected on January 25, 1989. The 
inspection certificate indicates that the owner is E-Z Auto Sales 
and the mileage was 46,811 miles. An affidavit filed with the 
Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the previous 
owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to 
defendant, indicates that the actual mileage was 146,811 miles. 
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased 
the Camper Van from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to 
the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven the vehicle. Paul Lives, 
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a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive. 
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short 
distance from defendant's lot. Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law 
inspected the vehicle. At this time, the odometer showed the 
mileage to be around 48,800 miles. Even though the vehicle was 
relatively old# with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the 
condition of the body, the three felt that it was in good 
mechanical condition* 
Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the 
odometer. Plaintiff remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown 
were the actual miles. Mr. Lives remembers the conversation 
differently. He testified that he told plaintiff to have the 
vehicle checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine 
the actual mileage on a car that old. During the week plaintiff 
talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of defendant. 
The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle. 
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations 
for defendant. Both Federal and State law require that the seller 
state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of ownership. The 
Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this 
information. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents 
of sale. On the Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the 
odometer reading, Mr. Memmott wrote 48,831. The Odometer 
Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states that "the 
odometer now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my 
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knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the 
vehicle...unless one of the following statements is checked: 
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the 
odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in 
excess of its mechanical limits. 
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the 
actual mileage. WARNING—ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he 
misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though 
he knew that the actual mileage was not 48,831 miles. When 
statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was 
an odometer discrepancy. Both plaintiff and his wife testified 
that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the 
odometer, was the actual miles of the vehicle. 
Plaintiff alleged that he had expended money for repairs on 
his vehicle, and rental of a truck to tow the vehicle back from 
Nevada after it had broken down a week after the purchase. The 
Trial Court accepted these items in arriving at damages, in 
addition to allowing a rescission of the contract. (R. 86). 
Defendant's evidence was that no fraud had occurred and that 
no misrepresentation of material fact was made to plaintiffs 
concerning the mileage. Defendant's exhibits included the Vehicle 
Buyer's Order and Purchase Agreement (R. 57), the Motor Vehicle 
sold As Is without any warranty form, signed by plaintiff, (R. 59), 
Odometer Statement from Robyn Duncan, showing mileage unknown (R. 
60), the Odometer Statement signed by plaintiff, indicating mileage 
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unknown, (R. 62), documents evidencing the stop payment by 
plaintiff on his credit card (R. 64), and documents prepared in 
connection with the repossession for the vehicle, several months 
after the transaction(R. 52-55). 
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the defendant's 
salesmen had told the plaintiff that the mileage was 100,000 less 
than actual. The vehicle had an odometer that only recorded 
mileage to 99,999 miles. The usual practice in Utah is to fill in 
the blank for odometer reading exactly as shown by the odometer 
itself. Further, the practice is to execute the federal disclosure 
form to conform with the information acquired from the prior owner, 
which, in this case was, mileage unknown. Thus, the disclosure 
form will indicate either actual miles, or actual miles in excess 
of mechanical capacity of the odometer (odometer rollover), or the 
fact of an odometer discrepancy (mileage unknown—odometer 
discrepancy). In this case the plaintiff was provided the federal 
odometer disclosure form, with box 2 marked mileage unknown, and he 
signed the Odometer Disclosure form indicating that he had received 
a copy of the form and that the disclosures were made thereon. 
Defendant's evidence contained documents signed by plaintiff 
wherein it was specifically set forth that the plaintiff had 
purchased the vehicle "as is," and that there were no warranties 
express or implied. The usual practice is that when an automobile 
is purchased, that the new owner thereafter becomes responsible for 
its maintenance and repair. Prior to the purchase the plaintiff 
had the vehicle inspected by his father-in-law, who was an 
6 
experienced Volkswagen mechanic. The plaintiff had every 
opportunity to check out the mechanical condition of the vehicle 
prior to the purchase. Even after the vehicle had broken down in 
Nevada, plaintiff had taken the vehicle to his father-in-law, who 
was in the process of overhauling the motor. The motor was in a 
state of disassembly at the time when it was repossessed by 
defendant, after the parties were unable to agree on a settlement. 
The defendant and his salesmen denied any false or misleading 
statements regarding mileage, and presented documents which conform 
to the reguirements of the odometer disclosure statute. The 
defense evidence was that no representation was made by anyone to 
the plaintiff, orally or in writing, that would lead him to believe 
that the vehicle had 48,000 actual miles. They affirmatively 
indicated that the odometer disclosure form specifically put 
plaintiff on notice that the miles were not actual. Further, the 
vehicle was nearly 10 years old, and defendant's position was that 
no reasonable person, not even this plaintiff, would have 
reasonably relied on the mileage on the odometer as being actual. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Argument I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE PROVISIONS OF 15 
U.S.C. SEC. 1981-1991 (FEDERAL ODOMETER STATUTE) IN FINDING FOR 
PLAINTIFF WHERE DEFENDANT HAD COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS ADVISED THAT THE 
MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN. 
The Trial Court erroneously construed the provisions of 15 
U.S.C. Sec* 1981-1991 (Federal Odometer Statute). The Trial judge 
erred in applying the federal odometer statute to this case. The 
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Court's conclusion that defendant salesman should have checked box 
1 and not box 2 is an incorrect interpretation of the statute. The 
defendant complied fully with the federal odometer statute, and was 
required to show mileage unknown. The error of the lower court 
requires reversal of the case. 
Argument II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF IN 
THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
The Court erred in failing to require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence of plaintiff's common law claims under state 
law. The plaintiff had never filed any pleadings claiming relief 
pursuant to the federal odometer statute. The judgment for 
rescission and damages are not supported by competent admissible 
evidence. The Court erred in not requiring clear and convincing 
evidence standard, which requires reversal of the case. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED THE PROVISIONS OF 15 
U.S.C. SEC. 1981-1991 (FEDERAL ODOMETER STATUTE) IN FINDING FOR 
PLAINTIFF WHERE DEFENDANT HAD COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE PLAINTIFF WAS ADVISED THAT THE 
MILEAGE WAS UNKNOWN. 
Defendant fully complied with the requirements of the odometer 
statute by delivering to the plaintiff a completed Odometer Mileage 
Statement accurately stating that the actual mileage was unknown as 
of the date of the transaction. The plaintiff signed the form, 
indicating that he had received the disclosure, and that there was 
an odometer discrepancy. 
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In Francesconi v. Kardon Chevrolet, Inc., 888 F.2d 18 (3rd 
Cir. 1989) the Court of Appeals held that a car salesman's 
inaccurate oral representations as to number of miles traveled were 
not actionable under the odometer act where the written disclosure 
form accurately reports the correct number of miles, and where the 
disclosure form is presented to the transferee at the time of the 
mileage, if known- (at p. 20) 
In the instant case, the Court erred in concluding that the 
defendant's salesman had misled the plaintiff by indicating in 
writing that the odometer was not to be relied upon, and that he 
should have informed the plaintiff that the mileage was in excess 
of 100,000 miles. Here, the vehicle had been taken in from the 
prior owner with the statement "mileage unknown". The salesman 
therefore, honestly could not state that the mileage was actual, 
subject to having exceeded the mechanical limits of the odometer 
instrument, and acordingly disclosed the mileage as "unknown." 
The principal objective of the federal odometer statute is the 
detect "rollbacksM of odometers. The statute provides for 
statutory "actual damages" for an odometer roll-back violation as 
the difference between the amount paid for the car and its fair 
and its fair market value at the time of sale. In Beachv v. Eagle 
Motors. Inc. » 637 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Ind. 1986) the Court held 
that the buyers are not entitled to recover as actual damages 
repairs which were not shown to have been occasioned by alleged 
misrepresentations inherent in a rollback. Thus, the Lower Court 
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was in error in using this statute to rule that the plaintiff was 
entitled to rescission and damages, plus attorney fees. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence to establish that the actual 
fair market price for the vehicle would have been any different 
than the actual purchase price. The amount he spent to rent a 
large truck was not a direct consequence of an odometer disclosure 
violation. The repairs he made were relatively minor, and were of 
the type to be included within the usual meaning of an was-is,f 
purchase. The ultimate failure of the motor in the desert of 
Nevada was more likely due to the neglect and abuse of the vehicle 
by the plaintiff, than from any odometer disclosure violation. 
The prevailing federal case is that if a transferor of a 
vehicle has actual or constructive knowledge that the odometer 
reading is incorrect, he has a duty to disclose that the actual 
mileage is unknown. Nieto v. Pencer 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1978). 
That Court construed the concept of a "knowing" violation, and 
concluded that the dealer has an affirmative duty to mark the 'true 
mileage unknown91 where he would have reason to know the mileage was 
more that recorded by the odometer or based upon the statement of 
the prior owner. 
That rule was followed in Utah in ChqrnetgKv Vt Gus Paulog 
Chevrolet. Inc.. 754 F. Supp. 188 (D. Utah, 1991), with the Court 
quoting with approval from the NietorsupraP case. See also Jones 
Vt FeirtQTl Ford, IllSt, 427 F. Supp. 1328 (1977); Duval v. Midwest 
Auto Citv, Inc., 578 F. 2d 721 (1978). These cases establish that 
the ultimate disclosure is the mileage unknown disclosure, and that 
10 
by making this disclosure according to the statute, the buyer 
thereby put on notice that the odometer is not to be relied upon. 
See Auto Sport Motors, v. Bruno Auto Dealers, 721 F. Supp. 63 
(S.D.N.Y., 1989) 
The defendant provided the plaintiff in this case full legal 
notice pursuant to the federal odometer statute. The defendants 
did not claim that the miles were actual. The evidence was 
disputed as to whether the plaintiff was informed that the odometer 
had rolled over. However, this is irrelevant in light of the more 
inclusive disclosure that the miles were unknown. Judge Griffiths 
erroneously concluded that the law required this defendant to check 
box 1, mileage in excess of mechanical limits. 
ARSPMENT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT FOR RESCISSION AND 
DAMAGES ON PLAINTIFF'S COMMON LAW FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION 
CLAIMS IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
The plaintiff failed to prove his case by clear and convincing 
evidence. In Shvthman Vt Creen RiV9r MPtel 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 
P. 2d , (Utah Ct.App. 1992), this Court, citing Pace v. 
Parrish. 122 Utah 144, 247 P 2d 273 (1952) reaffirmed that the 
elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: 
(1) that a misrepresentation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
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(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage, Accord Wright v. Westside 
Nursery. 787 P 2d 508 (Utah App. 1990). 
In Deboy v. Vallev Mortgage Co.. 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, P. 
2d (Utah Ct. App 1992) at p. 39, the Court considered claims of 
fraud and misrepresentation, and in particular, whether there was 
a "fraud by concealment.w Fraud, "comprises all acts, omissions 
and concealments involving a breach of legal or eguitable duty and 
resulting damage to another." Schwartz v. Tanner. 576 P 2d 873 
(Utah, 1978). 
The question of "whether a duty to speak exists is 
determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case." 
Elder v. Clawson. 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P 2d 802 (1963). A duty to 
speak will not be found where the parties deal at arm's length, and 
where the underlying facts are reasonably within the knowledge of 
both parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged 
to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his own 
interests. Sugarhouse Fin, v. Anderson. 610 P 2d 1369 (Utah 1980) 
23 Am Jur 856, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment, Sec. 78. 
In AtKJlngQn V. IHC »QgpjtaJ.g, In? tr 138 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 P. 
2d (Utah Sup. Ct. 1990) the Supreme Court found no fraud in the 
settlement of a personal injury case where the plaintiffs had been 
fully informed of the medical facts. Neither did it find negligent 
misrepresentation. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 552 
(1977). 
In the instant case, the Trial Court specifically did not find 
that the defendant had misrepresented the miles as actual, but that 
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he had a duty to disclose the fact that the mileage was in excess 
of the mechanical limits* But where the disclosure further advised 
plaintiff that mileage was unknown, the plaintiff was not misled by 
the mileage of the vehicle. Therefore, there was no duty to 
disclose in any event. 
The law is clear that to recover in fraud, a plaintiff must 
establish the element of reliance which is justifiable under the 
circumstances. In Cender v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P. 2d 
634 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) § p. 638, the Court discusses the public 
policy considerations, and cites Prosser and Keeton, The Law of 
Torts, Sec. 108, at 749-50 (5th Ed. 1984); 
If plaintiff can claim reliance on the basis 
of the kind of statement on which no 
reasonable person would rely for one reason or 
another, then it is quite likely that 
plaintiff did not rely and if his testimony 
that he did is allowed as sufficient evidence 
on the basis of which a finder of fact can 
find reliance, then it will be too easy for a 
party to a contract to escape the consequences 
of his own bad judgment in making a bargain of 
some kind. 
Further, the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages. 
A plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for any harm he 
could have reasonably avoided by the use of reasonable effort after 
the commission of a tort. See Cenderf supraf at p. 634 and cases 
cited therein. Any delay on the part of the defrauded party may 
constitute a waiver of the right to rescind the contract. Duaan v. 
Jones, 615 P 2d 1239 (Utah, 1980); Mecham v. Benson, 590 P 2d 304 
(Utah, 1979) 
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The Trial Court erroneously allowed plaintiff to rescind the 
contract, notwithstanding the fact that between August and December 
he had failed to deliver the vehicle back to the dealer. He had 
concealed it with his father-in-law. Even though he failed to pay, 
he kept the vehicle concealed from the dealer. When the van was 
repossessed for nonpayment, the dealer found that the motor had 
been completely disassembled. These actions constitute 
unreasonably delay, and are inconsistent with seeking the remedy of 
rescission. 
Further, the out of pocket damages claimed by plaintiff were 
not of the type that would arise from any alleged misrepresentation 
as to the mileage of the machine. Plaintiff believed that it was 
in good mechanical condition when he bought it. There was no 
evidence that the purchase price was not the actual fair market 
value for a van of that vintage. The mechanical failure was caused 
by the actions of the plaintiff, not through any misrepresentation 
on the part of the dealer. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Trial Court is in error and should be 
reversed, or a new trial ordered. 
DATED this K dav of April, 1994. 
JQIJII D. Russell ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant/Defendant Ronald K. Platts were served upon 
counsel for Plaintiff by delivering said copy, postage prepaid, to: 
James C. Haskins 
5085 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84107 
this Jl_day of April, 1994. 
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Third Judicial Circuit Court Of Salt Lake County 
Murray Department, State of Utah 
MARK ERICKSON, j 
Plaintiff, | 
vs. | 
E Z STREET AUTO SALES, | 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 903000298 
Defendant. 
In this action, the court is called upon to construe the mileage disclosure requirements 
as they apply to an odometer which has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles. The 
testimony presented at the trial is convoluted and each party challenges the others accuracy as 
to what occurred. Upon consideration of all the evidence, the court finds for the plaintiff as 
hereinafter set forth. 
September, 1989, defendant, E Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980 Volkswagen 
Camper Van for sale. The record is not clear when defendant acquired this vehicle for sale, 
but the facts establish that defendant had it inspected on January 25, 1989. The inspection 
certificate indicates that the owner is E Z Street Auto Sales and the mileage was 46,811 
miles. An affidavit filed with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the 
previous owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to defendant, indicates 
that the actual odometer reading was 146,811 miles. 
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased the Camper Van 
from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven 
the vehicle. Paul Lives, a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive. 
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short distance from defendant's 
lot. Plaintiffs wife and father-in-law inspected the vehicle. At this time, the odometer 
showed the mileage to be around 48,800 miles. Even though the vehicle was relatively old, 
with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that 
it was in good mechanical condition. 
*<? 
Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the odometer. Plaintiff 
remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives 
remembers the conversation differently. He testified that he told plaintiff to have the vehicle 
checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car that 
old. During the week plaintiff talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of 
defendant. The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle. Mr. Memmott never 
told plaintiff what the actual mileage was. 
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations for defendant. Both 
Federal and State law require that the seller state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of 
ownership. The Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this 
information. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents of sale. On the 
Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the odometer reading, Mr. Memmott wrote 
48,831. The Odometer Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states the 
odometer "now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my knowledge 
that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle....unless one of the following statements is 
checked. 
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading 
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits. 
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage. 
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.-
Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he misrepresented the 
mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though he knew that the actual mileage was not 
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was an 
odometer discrepancy. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told them that 
the 48,831 miles, as shown on the odometer, were the actual miles of the vehicle. 
Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 
for an out of state permit). Plaintiff paid for the purchase by using two credit cards by 
charging $3,000.00 on one card and $1,291.00 on the second. Plaintiff bought the vehicle 
"as is" and signed statements that he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties. 
Plaintiff drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming. During the first week 
of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door 
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. At the beginning of the second week, plaintiff, 
his wife, and one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles, California. The 
car broke down about 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada. It was towed to Las Vegas. 
Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul. 
That the cost of such an overhaul would be in the neighborhood of $2,000.00. He was also 
told that from the condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly 
in excess of the mileage figure shown on the odometer. 
y<r 
So as not to ruin their vacation trip to California, plaintiff rented a car in Las Vegas 
and continued on to Los Angeles. On their return trip, plaintiff rented a truck large enough 
to tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South Salt Lake, 
Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to rent the truck. The father-in-law, who 
is an experienced Volkswagen mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to 
repair it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he determined that a 
complete engine overhaul was necessary. 
Plaintiff was able to discover the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They 
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold it, was 146,811 miles. 
Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant 
insisted that under it's "as-is, no warranty11 contract it had no legal obligation to repair the 
engine. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty'1 
if he had known the mileage was over 100,000 miles. It is plaintiffs contention that Mr. 
Memmott knew or should have known that the correct mileage was 148,831 miles. That 
defendant committed fraud when both its salesman and manager misrepresented the actual 
mileage of the vehicle. That by putting the odometer reading of 48,831 miles on the 
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement, defendant violated the Federal 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991 (federal 
odometer statute). 
The U. S. Congress in § 1981 stated its findings that purchasers, when buying 
motor vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value 
of such vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate 
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate indication of the 
mileage traveled by a motor vehicle assists the purchaser in determining its safety and 
reliability. In actions brought under this act, courts have enforced strict accountability on 
any person transferring ownership of a vehicle. The standard of proof in actions based on 
fraud is the preponderance of evidence standard. The "intent to defraud" required for a 
violation includes action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action taken with the 
specific intent to deceive or cheat potential purchasers. See Ryan vs. Edwards. 592 F 2d 756 
(1979V. Havnes vs. Manning, 917 F2d 450 (1990^. 
In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the odometer of a used car is a factor 
which is likely to affect the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State v. 
Forshee. 588 P.2d 181. Plaintiff testified that he would have made a different deal, or no 
deal at all, had he known the actual mileage of the vehicle. 
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether defendant's salesman and manager 
told the plaintiff that the mileage of the vehicle was 100,00 miles less than the actual 
mileage. However, the court finds that from January, 1989, defendant's agents knew or 
w 
should have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that the actual mileage was 
100,000 miles more than as shown on the odometer. This information was not given to the 
plaintiff. Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual mileage 
on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement. 
"...when a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after 
registering 99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy 
the requirements of [the Act] is the total of 100,000 plus the number actually 
appearing on the odometer." Ryan v. Edwards. 592 P2d 760. 
What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to the actual mileage. Such conduct 
mislead the plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to 
defraud. 
The court finds that defendant, through the actions of its agents, committed fraud on 
the plaintiff. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant as follows: (1) The Purchase 
Agreement is rescinded. Plaintiffs obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, is 
cancelled. (2) Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from December 1, 1989, and his court costs. (3) Since the provisions of the Federal 
Act also apply to state actions (see § 1989), plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
(4) No punitive damages are awarded. 
Dated this 'Zyj-L day of November, 1992. 
L. H Grimms, Circuit Judge 
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James C. Haskins (1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
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Attorney for Plaintiff 7/J.MI29 ....li---
5085 South State Street . — •--[ 
Murray, Utah 84107 ..'
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Telephone: (801) 268-3994 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SALT LkKE' 'COUNTY 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MARK ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E.Z. STREET AUTO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 903000298 
This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and 
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge 
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department. 
The plaintiff, Mark Erickson, appeared in person and through 
his attorney, James C. Haskins and Jeff Hollingworth. The 
defendant, E.Z. Street Auto, appeared in person and through its 
attorney, John D. Russell. Evidence was produced by each of the 
parties through testimony and exhibits. At the conclusion of the 
presentation of testimony and exhibits, both parties rested. The 
court having heard all the evidence and being fully advised in 
the premises now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September 1989, Defendant E.Z. Street Auto offered a 
H 
1980 Volkswagen camper van ("Vehicle") for sale. 
2. On or about September 26, 1989, Plaintiff purchased the 
Vehicle from Defendant. 
3. Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of 
$4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 for an out of state permit). 
Plaintiff paid for the Vehicle's purchase using two credit cards. 
Plaintiff charged $1,291.00 on his American Express card and 
$3,000.00 on his Visa card. 
4. Approximately one week prior to purchasing the Vehicle, 
Plaintiff test drove the Vehicle accompanied by one of 
Defendant's salesman, Paul Lives. 
5. While on the test drive, Plaintiff stopped at his 
father-in-law's home and Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law 
inspected the Vehicle. At this time the odometer indicated that 
the mileage on the Vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles. 
6. Even though the Vehicle was relatively old, given the 
low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, 
the three felt that the Vehicle was in good condition. 
7. Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage shown on 
the odometer. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Lives told Plaintiff 
that the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives testified 
that he told Plaintiff to have the Vehicle checked by a mechanic 
because there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car 
that old. 
8. During the week prior to the Vehicle's purchase, 
Plaintiff spoke with Defendant's manager, Ronald Meramott, 
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regarding purchase terms. Both plaintiff and his wife testified 
that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the 
Vehicle's odometer, were the actual miles of the Vehicle. 
9. On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of 
Defendant, finalized the Vehicle's purchase with Plaintiff. 
10. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents 
transferring ownership of the Vehicle to Plaintiff. 
11. Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase Agreement on which he 
indicated the Vehicle's mileage as 48,831. 
12. Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement 
which stated in pertinent part: 
I E.Z. Street Auto state that the odometer . . . now 
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my 
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the 
Vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is 
checked. 
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge 
the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in 
excess of its mechanical limits. 
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT 
the actual mileage. WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
13. Mr. Memmott checked statement (2) and at trial denied 
that he misrepresented the mileage of the Vehicle to Plaintiff, 
even though he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of 
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on 
notice that there was an odometer discrepancy. 
14. Plaintiff bought the Vehicle "as is" and signed 
statements that he realized the Vehicle was sold without any 
warranties. 
15. Plaintiff drove the Vehicle to his home in Evanston, 
Wyoming and during the first week of operation he repaired the 
3 
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brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door 
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. 
16. At the beginning of the second week, Plaintiff, his 
wife, and their one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to 
Los Angeles, California. 
17. Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the 
Vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas. 
18. While in Las Vegas, Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen 
repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul at an 
estimated cost of $2,000.00. He was also told that from the 
condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage 
was greatly in excess of the mileage figure shown on the 
odometer. 
19. So as not to ruin their trip to California, plaintiff 
rented a car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles. 
On their return trip, Plaintiff rented a truck large enough to 
tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's 
home in South Salt Lake, Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car 
and $939.22 to rent the truck. 
20. The father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen 
mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair 
it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he 
determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary. 
21. Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair 
the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant insisted that under it's 
"as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to 
4 
repair the engine. 
22. Plaintiff, upon finding an old registration form, 
discovered the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They 
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold 
it, was 146,811 miles. 
23. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased 
the Vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the mileage was 
over 100,000 miles. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The U.S. Congress stated in its findings of the Federal 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1981-1991 ("Federal Odometer Statute"), that purchasers, when 
buying motor Vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an 
index of the condition and value of such Vehicle; that purchasers 
are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate 
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the Vehicle; that 
an accurate indication of the mileage traveled by a motor Vehicle 
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and reliability. 
2. In actions brought under the Federal Odometer Statute, 
courts have enforced strict accountability on any person 
transferring ownership of a Vehicle. The standard of proof in 
actions based on violation of the Federal Odometer Statute 
include action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action 
taken with the specific intent to deceive or cheat potential 
purchasers. See, Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (1979); Havnes v. 
Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (1990). 
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3. In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the 
odometer of a used a car is a factor which is likely to affect 
the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State 
v. Forshee, 588 P 2d, 181. Plaintiff testified that he would 
have made a different deal, or no deal at all, had he known 
Vehicle's actual mileage. 
4. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether 
Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff that the 
Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than the actual mileage. 
However, the court concludes that from January, 1989, Defendant's 
agents knew or should have known that the odometer had "turned 
over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as 
shown on the odometer. 
5. This information was not given to the plaintiff. Mr. 
Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual 
mileage on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase 
Agreement. 
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has 
"turned over" after registering 99,999 miles, the 
"cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy the 
requirements of (the Act) is the total of 100,000 plus the 
number actually appearing on the odometer." 
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P2d 760. 
6. What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to 
the actual mileage. Such conduct mislead the plaintiff and 
constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent 
to defraud. 
7. The court concludes that Defendant, through the actions 
6 
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of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff should be granted judgment against the 
defendant as follows: 
(1) The Purchase Agreement should be rescinded. 
Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, 
should be cancelled; 
(2) Plaintiff should be awarded damages of $1,212.80, 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989, and 
his court costs of $104.00; 
(3) Since the provisions of the Federal Act also apply 
to state actions (see § 1989), Plaintiff should be awarded 
$1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
(4) No punitive damages should be awarded. 
DATED this day of SMA&2Z± y  <^FQAJ^~a**\ . 1993. 
By the Court: 
Judge 
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James C. Haskins (1406) FILED 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff ? '... 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MARK ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E.Z. STREET AUTO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No- 903000298 
This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and 
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge 
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department and the court having made its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant; 
2. The Purchase Agreement is rescinded; 
3. Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card 
charges, is cancelled; 
4. Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, plus 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989 until 
paid in full. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded his court costs of $104.00; 
n 
6. Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
7. Plaintiff is not awarded any punitive damages. 
DATED this 'jsOA day of ^JBA\AAA*A~IA 1993. 
By the Court: 
L. H Griffiths/f/circuit Judge 
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SELLER: VEHICLE B p ' R ' S ORDER AND PURCHASE / f "EEMENT 
E.Z. STREET AUTO 
4100 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 268-6322 
A Date 7 " 
Purchaser's Name ^ 
/ S t r e e t Address C 
City County Slate ZipCode 
7g7 -ffg0 2_ 
Res Phone Bus Phone 
I/We hereby order from you and agree to purchase from you subject to all terms, conditions and agreements contained herein, and the conditions printed on the 
reverse side hereof the following vejptyle. f) _
 m -. 
DNEW^USED DDEMO YEAR Q ^ MAKE V'VV SALESMAN-
lyiec VJ puiuiioac iium yui 
755i - faL. 
SFRIFS E ' 1 f l > * / l j 7 & ^
 B 0 D Y TYPE- l/*M -COLOR &OtJb*\*l .ODOMETER. 
V.I.N. STOCK NO. 
DEL. 
DATE. 
CASH SELLING PRICE 
ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
Buver is responsible for all liability. 
insurant , damage due to collision. ^ 
feS'/TfrriL '7/<&&~~0hs^ 
Car sold as is, as equipped, no free work 
nromi§ed, no implied warranty 
(*) yrte^^/ ^yi^L*—, 
Customer guarantees financing has been 
obtained / - _*» <* 
'T^Jry^V jC^sJL*^ 
VEHICLE WITH ACCESSORIES/OPTIONS 
SERVICE C O N T R A C T 
DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE 
SUB TOTAL 
TRADE ALLOWANCE 
TAXABLE AMOUNT 
UTAH SALES TAX 
LICENSE & REGISTRATION 
PROPERTY TAX DUE 
DEALER HANDLING FEE 
_^ 
krf of*srsj9ite &<~rt* T* 
TOTAL OF ABOVE ITEMS 
TOTAL CREDITS (Tmwtemd from right column) 
BALANCE DUE 
$ 
rT~ 
- y — 
$ 
i _ 
$ 
Vl t fe 'C? 
*MK 
-
4MB 
_-_ 
^5^° 
^ 7 
L 
USED TRADE-IN AND/OR OTHER CREDITS 
MAKE OF TRADE-IN MILES 
YEAR BODY TYPE SERIES 
V.I.N. 
BALANCE OF £ OWED TO 
TO BE PAID BY: D PURCHASER D SELLER 
ADDRESS 
GOOD VERIFIED 
UNTIL: BY: DATE: 
USED VEHICLE ALLOWANCE 
BALANCE OWED ON VEHICLE 
NET ALLOWANCE ON USED VEHICLE 
DEPOSIT 
CASH WITH ORDER 
TOTAL CREDIT (Transfer to Left Column) 
DOCUMENTS — Signed and Received 
P Trfle (If not, explain* 
) 
—_-__________--__-_-_________________________________________ / 
D Registration Q Out-of-State Aff. 
D Odometer Statement D Power of Attorney 
• Bill of Sale D Auth. for Payoff 
OTHFR TERMS AfiRFFH TO- UBS^USBSBBm^ 
_^_fl^__QWHH_H 
_^H_fl-__-H-^-_r 
fl__H____^_^__^__i 
fl_iN^^__H__V 
^^^(__H-i-B_W 
Purchaser agrees that this agreement includes all of the terms^ndcRidi-
tions on both the face and reverse side hereof, that this agreement cancels 
and supersedes any prior agreement and as of the date hereof comprises the 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to 
the subject matters covered hereby, and that THIS AGREEMENT SHALL 
NOT BECOME BINDING UNTIL ACCEPTED BY SELLER OR HIS AUTHO-
RIZED REPRESENTATIVE. Purchaser by his execution of this agreement 
acknowledges that he has read its terms and conditions and has received a 
true copy of this agreement. 
* Ort^%s^j^~4fc*m 
Purchaser'* Signature v * * \ D a t e 
f J c GLs 
Arj^ CDTcn nv- *^xP\_*J V\JL^y**^foMr 
' >~a_J Dealer or Sales Manager 
CONDITIONS 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED: 
The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subject to the following terms and conditions which have been mutually agreed 
upon:. 
1. The manufacturer has reserved the right to change the list price of new motor vehicles without notice and in the event that the 
list price of the new vehicle purchased hereunder is so changed, the cash delivered price, which is based on list price effective 
on the day of delivery, will govern in this transaction. But if such cash delivered price is increased the buyer may. if 
dissatisfied with such increased price, cancel this order, in which event if a used vehicle has been traded in as a part of the 
consideration herein, such used vehicle shall be returned to the purchaser upon the payment of a reasonable charge for 
storage and repairs (if any) or, if the used vehicle has b§en previously sold by the dealer, the amount received therefor, less a 
selling commission of 15% and any expense incurred in storing, insuring, conditioning or advertising said vehicle for sale, 
shall be returned to the purchaser. 
2. The purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of 
such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear 
excepted, and the buyer warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all lien and encumbrances except as 
otherwise noted of the reverse side hereof. 
3. Upon the failure or refusal of the purchaser to complete said purchase for any reason other than cancellation on account of 
increase in price, the cash deposit may be retained as liquidated damages, or in the event a used vehicle has been taken in 
trade, the purchaser hereby authorizes dealer to sell said used vehicle, and the dealer shall be entitled to reimburse himself 
out of the proceeds of such sale, for the expenses specified in paragraph 1 above and also for his expenses and losses 
incurred or suffered as the result of purchaser's failure to complete said purchase. 
4. The manufacturer has the right to make any changes in the model or design of any accessories and part of any new motor 
vehicle at any time without creating any obligation on the part of either the Dealer or the Manufacturer, to make 
corresponding changes in the vehicle covered by this agreement either before or subsequent to the delivery of such vehicle 
to the purchaser. 
5. Dealer shall not be liable for delays caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties, fires, or other causes beyond the control 
of the dealer. 
6. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER THE 
DEALER OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED 
HEREUNDER, EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL 
BE DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE 
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING. BUT NOT LIMITED TO. ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANT ABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. AND THE REMEDIES SET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES 
AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS. 
NO WARRANTIES. EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY THE DEALER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES 
OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE 
DEALER FOR SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY. IF SO EXPRESSED IN 
WRITING. IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF. 
7. In case the vehicle covered by this agreement is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made as to 
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the speedometer of said used vehicle. 
8. In the event that it becomes necessary for Dealer to enforce any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, purchaser 
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. ^ - ^ 
9. This agreement is Non-Transferable. 
10. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN 
THIS AGREEMENT. 
11. PURCHASER REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older. 
12. Title to the vehicle is to remain vested in the Dealer until purchase price is paid in full; purchaser grants to dealer a security 
interest in the subject vehicle to secure said payment in full. "**T 
13. No agreement, verbal or otherwise, not contained in this agreement will be recognizedr-
14. In case the vehicle covered by this agreement is a used vehicle, the information you see on the window form (Buyer's Guide) 
for this vehicle is part of this contract. I nf ormation on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract sale. 
ODOIVC TER DISCLOSURE STAVJVIENT 
Federal law (and State law, if applicable) requires that you state the mileage upon transfer 
of ownership. Failure to complete or providing a false statement may result in fines and/or 
imprisonment. 
^ ^ > s £ i > jfar« 
(transferors name — PRINT) sxpO*ZL / (of the vehicle described below) now reads *rG&<^ / 
_. state that the odometer 
.(no tenths) miles 
and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described 
below, unless one of the following statements is checked 
D (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the 
„ s amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits 
1&{2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage WARNING — 
ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
1 MAKE ~ BODY TYRE / MODEL ^ 
VEHICLE ID-NUMBER 
COLOR 
STOCK NUMBER 
TRIM . 
TRANSFEROR S PRINTED NAME (SELLER) 
TRANSFEROR S STREET ADDRESS 
*//&b **1> f?*^ 
CITY STATE ZIP CODE 
S&tJT' £+&£- tefat- fV/try 
0ATE OF STATEMENT TRANSFEBpR S SIGNATURE (SELLER) 
PRINTED NAME OF PERSON SIGNING 
TRANSFEREES PRINTED NAME (BUYER) 
STREET ADDRESS 
g j ^ . UjiU- Cll>&£ FT 
S . T. / STATE . ^ CITY 
&\Z4OS$T0A/ UsY 
2IPCODE 
< g ^ 7 3 ^ 
RECEIPT OF COPY ACKNOWLEDGED 
4* QrTtxtA^ V ^*ZM*~^\ 
TRANSFEREE S SIGNATURE - BUYER DATE 
PRINTED NAME OF PERSON SIGNING DATE 
102-3 it. 
.-.--"j->-</•' 1\ SSSL*" 
MOTORVEHJCLvESOLD^^ 
MT«OMr , % ; i l I , * n n " , ! p m ¥ 
VEHICLE PURCHASED 
DATE . ODOMETER MILEAGE 
MAKE_JZU^ MODEL _0*»4fr«~ V+" 
YEAR -74 SERIAL NO. ZS-Ao/otw
2
-
THE ABOVE DESCRIBED MOTOR VECHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITH THE FOLLOWING WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS 
BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF THIS DISCLAIMER ON 
THE ^ * ^ DAY OF 
c i r i w r i m o uiov^i_Miivtc:i 
BUYER WITNESS 
BUYER WITNESS 
^^^^^^'^^^^f.^s^^^^^^r^ >^5*»*v. 
[ ^ODOMETER DISCk^SURE ST^"EMENT ( 
v ^Federal law (and State law. if applicable) requires that you state the mileage upon transfer 
I of ownership Failure to c4£ft>lete or providing a false statement may result in fines and/or 
i Imprisonment /\ 
, state that the odometer 
(transferors name — PR,N"0//z,£w-'*7 
(of the vehicle described below) now roaHc A/AW/ / (no tenths) miles 
and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle described 
below, unless one of the following statements is checked 
• (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the 
amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits 
^ ( 2 ) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage WARNING — 
ODOMETER DISCREPANCY 
MAKE / , BOOY TYPE , 
\JM/, I JAA/ MODEL / &MP \/*A/ 
VEHICLE ID-NUMBER 
COLOR 
J^AQlOtCflA STOCK NUMBER 
&WWA/ 
TRIM ORK_ £/m/rt&ZD 
TRANSFERROR S PRINTED N A M * (SELLER) . 
TRANSFEROR S STREET ADDRESS A 
CITY STATE 
mm/MF 
ZIP CODE 
OATE OF STATEMENT 
#<!M3 
TRANSFEREE S PRINTED NAME (BUYER) 
RETTADDRISIS STflE 
CITY UT~«-STATE • * * 
^OL^. 
ZIP CODE' 
F COPY ACKNOWLEDGED 
X / J r r r Z / 
URE - 8UYER 
L&S-
OATE 
PRINTED NAME O f PERSON SIGNING 
102-3 
1 uiM 
OATE 
£o 
15 USCS § 1987 C O M M E R C E A N D T R A D E 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Am Jur: 
7A Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 183, 185. 
Am Jur Proof of Facts: 
Fraudulent Alteration of Odometer, 1 Am Jur Proof of Facts 2d, p. 
677. 
Forms: 
10 Federal Procedural Forms L Ed, Highways and Bridges § 38:4. 
12 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev), Fraud and Deceit, Form 40. 
Annotations: 
Validity, construction, and application of odometer requirement provi-
sions of Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 USCS 
§§ 1981-1991). 28 ALR Fed 584. 
Law Review Articles: 
Consumer Remedies for Odometer Tampering: The Odometer Require-
ments of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act. 10 
Clearinghouse Rev 25, May, 1976. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
Although 15 USCS § 1987 requires notice to 
be attached to left door frame of vehicle when 
odometer is serviced, repaired, or replaced, dis-
closure requirements as to motorcycle odometers 
may be satisfied merely by hanging tag on mo-
torcycle to place potential purchasers on notice 
of alteration in mileage registered on odometer, 
and statutory provision is not so vague and 
uncertain as to be unconstitutional as applied to 
motorcycles. Grambo v Loomis Cycle Sales, Inc. 
(1975, ND Ind) 404 F Supp 1073. 
Defendant's (truck seller's) motion for sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to plaintifTs 
(buyer's) claim under 15 USCS § 1987 for al-
leged odometer alteration without disclosure of 
actual mileage"traveled would be denied, because 
whether failure to post required notice was done 
with intent to defraud was question of fact 
which could be established by inference, and 
evidence alleged by plaintiff—which must be 
assumed to be true on motion for summary 
judgment—could have led to inference of intent 
to defraud. Lair v Lewis Service Centers, Inc 
(1977, DC Neb) 428 F Supp 778. 
§ 1988. Disclosure requirements upon transfer of ownership of 
motor vehicle 
(a) Promulgation of rules. Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 20, 1972], the Secretary shall prescribe 
rules requiring any transferor to give the following written disclosure to 
the transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of a motor 
vehicle: 
(1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer. 
(2) Disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown, if the odometer 
reading is known to the transferor to be different from the number of 
miles the vehicle has actually traveled. 
Such rules shall prescribe the manner in which information shall be 
disclosed under this section and in which such information shall be 
retained. 
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(b) Violations of rules and giving false statements to transferees prohibited. 
No transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section or give a 
false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such 
rule. 
(c) Acceptance of incomplete written disclosure by transferees acquiring 
ownership for resale prohibited. No transferee who, for purposes of resale, 
acquires ownership of a motor vehicle shall accept any written disclosure 
required by any rule prescribed under this section if such disclosure is 
incomplete.] 
(Oct. 20, 1972, P. L. 92-513, Title IV, §408, 86 Stat. 962; July 14, 1976, P. 
L. 94-364, Title IV, § 406, 90 Stat. 983.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Explanatory notes: 
Subsec. (c) has been set out in brackets because Act July 14, 1976, 
provided for the amendment of subsec. (b) of this section and in 
addition set out a subsec. (c), but the Act contained no enacting clause 
for subsec. (c). 
Effective date of section: 
Subsec. (a) of this section effective Oct. 20, 1972, and subsec. (b) 
effective "ninety calendar days following" such date; see the note to 15 
USCS §1981. 
Amendments: 
1976. Act July 14, 1976, substituted subsec. (b) for one which read: "It 
shall be a violation of this section for any transferor to violate any rules 
under this section or to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee 
in making any disclosure required by such rules/*; and purportedly 
added subsec. (c); see the Explanatory note to this section. 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Rule-making procedures, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 49 CFR 
Part 5. 
Rule making procedures of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, 49 CFR Part 553. 
Odometer disclosure requirements, 49 CFR Part 580. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Definitions, 15 USCS §§1901, 1982. 
Conspiracy to violate prohibitions, 15 USCS § 1986. 
Disclosure requirements regarding repair or replacement of odometer, 15 
USCS § 1987. 
Civil liability for violations, 15 USCS § 1989. 
Injunctions against violations, 15 USCS § 1900. 
This section is referred to in 15 USCS § 1986. 
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